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ALBERTO MOTTA

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Personal Information:

Date of Birth: July 20, 1978
Citizenship: Italian

Current position:

2009 – present, Assistant Professor, University of New South Wales (AU)

Undergraduate Studies:

B.A., Economics, University of Padua, Magna cum Laude

Graduate Studies:

Ph.D. (Economics) with honors, University of Padua, September 2009

Thesis Title: “*Optimal Mechanisms Against Collusion: Incentives, Self Reporting and Delegation*”

Thesis Committee and References:

Professor A. Nicolò (Advisor)
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Professor D. Mookherjee (Advisor)
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Professor G. Weber
33 Via del Santo
Padua, 35123, Italy
(+39)0498274271, guglielmo.weber@unipd.it

Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary fields: Contract and Organization Theory, Microeconomics, Development Economics
Secondary field: Macroeconomics

Teaching Experience:

Spring, 2009	Microeconomics (Ph.D. level), University of Venice, Instructor
Spring, 2009	Information Economics (undergraduate), University of Padua, Teaching Assistant
Fall, 2008	Macroeconomics (undergraduate), University of Padua, Teaching Assistant
Spring, 2008	Information Economics (undergraduate), University of Padua, Teaching Assistant
Fall, 2007	Macroeconomics (undergraduate), University of Padua, Teaching Assistant
Fall, 2005	Macroeconomics (undergraduate), University of Padua, Teaching Assistant

Professional Activities:

Referee	Journal of Development Economics, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Seminars	University of Toulouse I, France (2009) University of Cambridge, UK (2009)

	University of New South Wales, Australia (2009)
	University of Aarhus, Denmark (2009)
	Università Federico II Napoli – CSEF, Italy (2009)
	Boston University, USA (2006, 2007, 2008)
	University of Padua, Italy (2006, 2007, 2008)
	University of Trento, Italy (2008)
Conferences	Northeastern Universities Development Consortium Conference, USA (2009)
	IX ISQOLS Conference, Florence (2009)
	Happiness and Relational Goods, Venice (2009)
	“Spring of Incentives” Workshop, University of Toulouse I (2009)
	Royal Economic Society Fourth PhD Presentation Meeting, London (2009)
	MEA Annual Meeting, Cleveland (2009)
	Northeastern Universities Development Consortium Conference, Boston (2008)
	Simposio de Analisis Economico, University of Zaragoza (2008)
	ASSET, University of Florence (2008)
	ASSET, University of Padua (2007)
Visiting	Boston University (October - December 2009)
	Boston University (November 2008)
	Boston University (January 2006 - August 2007)
	Boston University (May 2008)
Summer	Inequality, Poverty and Development, University of Verona (2006)
Schools	Economics of corruption, University of Passau, Germany (2007)

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2008 - 2009	Project: “Efficiency and Incentives in Excludible Public Goods” Project: “The Economics of Crime”
2006 - 2007	Project: “The HIV-AIDS Epidemic in Developing and Transition Countries”
Fall, 2005	University of Padua, Research Assistant
Spring, 2005	University of Padua, Research Assistant
Fall, 2004	World Health Organization, Advanced Research Assistant

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2008 - 2009	Scholarship for continued research activity, Department of Economics, University of Padua, Italy
2006 - 2007	Scholarship for visiting position at Boston University, University of Padua, Italy
2004 - 2008	Scholarship for Doctoral studies, Public Education Ministry, Italy
2000 - 2001	Scholarship Socrates-Erasmus in Economic Studies, Jordanstown University, U.K

Chapter in Books:

“*Functionings, Capacities and Social Interactions*,” 2006, in Pierluigi Sacco and Stefano Zamagni (Ed.) *Economic Theory and Interpersonal Relationships*, Il Mulino.

Research Papers:

“*Collusion and Selective Supervision*”

Abstract: This paper studies the role of a policy of inducing “selective supervision” in combating collusion within organizations or in regulatory setups. In a mechanism design problem involving a principal-supervisor-agent we show the role of endogenous selection of supervisory activity by the principal. One simple example is a mechanism in which the agent bypasses the supervisor and contracts directly with the principal in some states of the world. If collusion between supervisor and agent can occur only after they have decided to participate in the mechanism, this can costlessly eliminate collusion. This result is robust to alternative information structures, collusive behaviors and specification of agent's types. Applications include self reporting of crimes, tax amnesties, immigration amnesties, work contracts specifying different degrees of discretion, mechanisms based on recommendation letters, embassies issuing immigration permits, and hiring committees.

“Why Aren't Developed Countries Saving?” (with Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Boston University and Loretta Dobrescu, University of Padua)

Abstract: National saving rates differ enormously across developed countries. But these differences obscure a common trend, namely a dramatic decline over time. France and Italy, for example, saved over 17 percent of national income in 1970, but less than 7 percent in 2006. Japan saved 30 percent in 1970, but only 8 percent in 2006. And the U.S. saved 9 percent in 1970, but only 2 percent in 2006. What explains these international and intertemporal differences? Is it demographics, government spending, productivity growth or preferences? Our answer is preferences. Developed societies are placing increasing weight on the welfare of those currently alive, particularly contemporaneous older generations. This conclusion emerges from estimating two models in which society makes consumption and labor supply decisions in light of uncertainty over future government spending, productivity, and social preferences. The two models differ in terms of the nature of preference uncertainty and the extent to which current society can control future societies' spending and labor supply decisions.

“Self-Reporting in Law Enforcement when Officers are Corruptible” (with Alfredo Burlando, Boston University)

Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of self reporting on law enforcement when officers are corruptible. The threat of corruption highlights two additional advantages to the use of self reporting. First, by allowing individuals to self report their unlawful act, the government is able to increase welfare by eliminating rents to its officers. Second, due to the reduction in corruption costs, the introduction of self reporting allows governments to fully eliminate corruption.

“Ex-ante and ex-post corruption”

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, in charged with monitoring evasion from a taxpayer. Namely, I discuss how the optimal compensation policy varies according to the timing of collusion, which is allowed to occur either before or after inspection takes place. This paper shows that increasing the bonus rate is a better policy than increasing the penalty rate when corruption occurs after inspection. The contrary is true when the collusive agreement is established before the inspection. Implications for privatization of law enforcement are analyzed.

“Conditional Delegation and Optimal Supervision”, (with Alfredo Burlando, Boston University)

Abstract: This paper analyzes a simple modification of a standard mechanism in hierarchical centralized structures with hard-information supervision. The supervisor receives a signal about the productive agent's technology. With some probability the supervisor learns the true agent's technology, otherwise she learns nothing. Our design lets the productive agent choose between two competing contracts, a “secure” contract or a grand contract subject to uncertainty. The mechanism eliminates agency costs by providing the productive agent with the possibility of avoiding inspection. When productive agent is risk averse, our mechanism also provides him with an insurance coverage: as a consequence, this mechanism would be worthwhile even abstracting from collusion.

Work in Progress:

“Staying home or dining out? Social interactions and old-age consumption profiles,” with Loretta Dobrescu and Benedetto Gui

Abstract: The paper develops a dynamic structural life-cycle model, wherein single retired individuals can choose to consume food at home, food outside home and pay phone services. The model is estimated using the simulated method of moments on SHARE data. The main contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it provides estimates for the relative risk aversion coefficients for consumption of food in and out of home and of phone services. Second, the paper studies the impact of social activities and health on individuals consumption patterns.

“Testing inconsistency hypothesis in consumption choices,” with Loretta Dobrescu

Computer Skills: MATLAB, STATA, EVIEWS, Microsoft Office

Languages: Italian (native), English (fluent), French (basic), Spanish (basic)